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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNITY
REDEVELOPMENT LAWS
By WALTER MARSTON SHARMAN
There is no longer room for doubt that Commumty Redevelopment
Laws occupy a substantial place in our law They have been enacted by at
least thirty-four states and four territories.' These laws seek by use of the
police power and/or the power of eminent domain to remove blighted areas
from the community, substituting in their place a master plan of redevelop-
ment.2 The problem which faces the lawyer or judge when dealing with
Community Redevelopment Laws is in keeping the power exercised by the
government within well defined constitutional limits. It is the possibility
of the state taking private property in derogation of the private right, which
causes the greatest trouble.
Source of the States Power.
Commumty Redevelopment Laws seek to assert the collective right
against the individual right. They are framed in words of police power and
authorize condemnation by eminent domain.
What is the police power? It is a sovereign's inherent power to provide
for the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Through this
power the government may destroy or regulate the use of property in order
to promote the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the community The
police power may be exercised without making compensation for the im-
paired value or use of the property I
Eminent domain is the power of a sovereign to take land for a public
use, and is essential to the continued existence of a government.4 The only
limits on it are that the land be taken for a public use and that the con-
demnee to be justly compensated.5
The basic difference between the police power and the power of eminent
domain is that the former has primarily a negative regulatory aspect, while
eminent domain has an aspect of later application to a different and public
use.6 The police power regulates through destruction of or interference with
detrimental uses of property Eminent domain operates by taking the fee
to make some positive use of the property for the public. Some well settled
examples are acquiring land for a park, highway, or government building.
I Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Flonda, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands.
2 For example: LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 991 (1945).
3 Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, -Fla.- , 60 So.2d 663 (1952).
4 U.S. v Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236, 237 (1946), Kohl v U.S., 91 U.S. 367 (1875),
Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 41 (Tenn. 1832).
5U.S. CoNST. AmEND. V
6 Nashville Housing Authority v. City of Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951),
fllinois Central Railroad Co. v Monarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 459, 186 S.W 1053 (1916).
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Community Redevelopment Laws recite that the legislature has found
to exist certain blighted areas which are detrimental to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare.7 Normally, they then provide for the creation
of agencies, which are to work with local planning commissions in alleviat-
ing these conditions. The agencies are empowered, inter alia, to acquire
land by gift, devise, purchase, or eminent domain.'
Redevelopment Laws and the Dual Area Problem.
Most of the Community Redevelopment Laws cover two types of blight-
ed areas. For convenience these will be referred to as "slum" on the one
hand and "deteriorated" on the other. A fundamental difference exists be-
tween these two and it must be kept in mind when characterizing the legal
problems presented by each.9
A slum is a district, generally located within large cities, where crowded
buildings stand in great disrepair. Overcrowded rooms, inhabited by rats,
fleas, and lice render living conditions unhealthful. There is an abnormally
high incidence of disease, crime, juvenile delinquency, and immorality. °
On the other hand, the deteriorated area is predominantly vacant land.
Faulty planning and irregular layout make lots and streets unusable. Streets
are laid without regard to land contours. Its great fault is that it is an eco-
nomic drag on the community and the taxpayer.' It represents a block to
active economic expansion deemed good for the general welfare,' and it
absorbs tax funds greater than the wealth it produces.', However economi-
cally undesirable it may be, the deteriorated area cannot be said to breed
crime, disease, juvenile delinquency, or immorality.'4
The importance in recognizing the inherent differences between the two
areas is made apparent by the nature of the powers asserted by the state.
Under the police power the slum may be said to be detrimental to the public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare. But what is the deteriorated
area, which is not detrimental to health, safety, or morals? To sustain the
Community Redevelopment Laws as applied to the deteriorated area it
must be found that the application falls within the police power to regulate
for the general welfare alone.
These differences are also important in applying the power of eminent
domain. The elimination of slums has been held to be a public use. 5 The
case of Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency et al.'
7 CALF. HEALTH AND SAETY CODE §§ 33040, 33049.
8 CALiF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33267(a), (b).
9 Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, 117 F.Supp. 705 (1953), Re-
development Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 CalApp.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954).
io0 CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33041.
11 CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 34042, Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v.
Hayes, supra note 9.
-CA=. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33044(a).
13 CAiW. HEALTH AND SATET CODE §§ 33043, 33044(b).
14 Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, supra note 9.
25 See note 14 supra.
16 See note 14 supra.
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indicated that the elimination of deteriorated areas would not be a public
use. What is a public use is a question that has faced many judges and is
by its nature impossible of precise definition.
Eminent Domain: What is a Public Use?
Two views have evolved from the decisions as to what does or does not
constitute a public use within the constitutional limitation on the power of
eminent domain. The more limited view is that "public use" means actual
use by the public, %.e., that for a taking to be within the power of eminent
domain some further use by the public other than the purpose which moti-
vates the taking must be contemplated. 7 The more liberal view is that pub-
lic use means only that some utility or benefit to the public must result from
the taking.' s These two views and the reasons behind them may best be
illustrated by contrasting the following statements:
"From the nature of the cases there can be no precise line. The power
requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of meeting new conditions and
improvement, and the ever increasing necessities of society The sole de-
pendence must be upon the presumed wisdom of the sovereign authority,
supervised and, in cases of gross error or extreme wrong, controlled by the
dispassionate judgment of the courts."'19
Criticizing this view is the statement by Lewis cited with approval in
Arnsperger v. Crawford.'
"Public use means use by the public It accords with the pnmary
and more commonly understood meaning of the words; second, it accords
with the general practice in regard to taking private property for a public
use, in vogue when the phrase was employed in the earlier constitutions;
and, third, it is the only view which gives these words any force as a limita-
tion or renders them capable of any definite and practical application."
Yet, in Olmstead v. Camp' it is further stated.
"The defendant insists that m favor of private rights, the construction
should be stnct, and that the term 'public use' means possession, occupa-
tion, direct enjoyment, by the public. Or in other words that the property
must literally be taken by the public as a body into its direct possession and
for its actual use, as in the instances of a state-house, a court house, a fort,
an arsenal, a park, etc.
"It seems to us that such a limitation of the intent of this important
clause would be entirely different from its accepted interpretation, and
17 Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953), Jordon v.
Woodward, 40 Me. 317 (1855), Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47,
88 AtI. 904 (1913).
18 Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, supra note 9; Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866).
19 Olmstdead v. Camp, supra note 18.
20 101 Md. 247, 253, 61 At. 413, 415 (1905).
2-33 Conn. 532 (1866).
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would prove as unfortunate as novel. One of the most common meanings of
the word 'use' and defined by Webster, is 'usefulness, utility, advantage,
productive of benefit.' 'Public use' may therefore well mean public useful,
ness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit; so that
any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of emi-
nent domain for the purposes of great advantage to the community, is
taking for a public use."-2
It can be seen from the above citations that there exists and has existed
for some time a clear-cut divergence of opinion as to what public use means
within the power of eminent domain. Olmstead v. Camp, supra, takes an
elastic viewpoint, which permits current concepts of general public welfare
to control the meaning of public use. The Arnsperger case takes a narrow,
strictly confined attitude, which sacrifices elasticity for definiteness. This
view requires actual physical use to be made by the public in the future.
Recent authority favors the Olmstead view.
Community Redevelopment Laws further complicate the determina-
tion of what is a public use within the power of eminent domaiti by provid-
ing for resale of the land to private individuals under proper restrictions for
redevelopment along the lines of the master plan.
Community Redevelopment Laws and the Aspect of Resale
to Private Individuals for Redevelopment.
The importance of distinguishing between the "actual use by the pub-
lic" doctrine and the "public benefit" doctrine is made evident by the Com-
munity Redevelopment Laws. Since the land acquired may be resold to
private individuals or be made available to private enterprise for redevel-
opment, there is no continuing physical use by the public at large to be
made of the areas after the acquisition.
Two sides have been taken on the question of whether or not this con-
templated resale to private individuals renders the action unconstitutional.
Those in accord with the "use by the public" doctrine hold that this resale
to private individuals with the possibility of private gain contaminates the
whole project. Hence, it is a private use and unconstitutional. On the
other hand, the "public benefit" followers hold that the public use lies in
the elimination of slum and deteriorated areas, the reconstruction and re-
habilitation of the areas, and the adaption of them to uses which will pre-
vent a recurrence of the conditions.24 The provision making the land avail-
able to private enterprise for redevelopment, which will result in private
22 Accord, AxGEi WATmR CouRszs 457 (7th ed. 1877), Contra, Arnsperger v. Crawford,
supra note 20.23 Holding Florida and Georgia Laws unconstitutional, see Adams v. Housing Authority
of Daytona Beach, supra note 3; Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, supra note 17.24 Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, supra note 9; Rowe v. Hous-
ing Authority of Little Rock, 220 Ark. 698, 249 S.W.2d 551 (1952), Redevelopment Agency
of San Francisco v. Hayes, supra note 9; Chicago Land Clearance Commission v. White, 411 IIl.
310, 104 N.E.2d 236 (1952), Kaskel v. Impelliteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953) ; Foeller
v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953), Oliver v. City of Clairton,
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gain, is held to be incidental to the main purpose and, hence, not objec-
tionable.
Two cases have held these laws to be unconstitutional.' In each the
contemplated private gain contaminated the whole exercise of the power.
Naturally, all cases agree that private property may not be taken arbitrar-
ily to be transferred to another private individual for private gain. The
divergence of opimon appears in deciding just when this is being done. In
both cases the project before the court concerned the redevelopment of
slum areas solely for commercial purposes. Some stress is laid on this point
by the California court in Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco et al.
v Hayes et al.,6 which upheld the validity of the Califorma Redevelop-
ment Law It should be noted that these cases mentioned above not only
held the projects to be unconstitutional but also the laws themselves, which
were similar to the California statute.
Another attempt at distinguishing these cases was made with regard to
the Community Redevelopment Law of Florida,27 which recited as one pur-
pose of the law, the acquisition of blighted areas to be made available to
private enterprise. However, just such a provision' was upheld in a recent
Virginia case' and is in reality merely a statement of what other Commu-
nity Redevolpment Laws imply
Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson"° concludes that the object of
these laws is.
" to clear away slum areas or deteriorated areas and then to have
the property redeveloped by private individuals for private purposes in
such manner as the city and Housing Authority determine to be best.
"The power of eminent domain is to be exercised to accomplish this
result. The property is to be sold to people who could have no interest in
acquiring the property other than as a means to make money If the prop-
erty of one individual can be taken from another for this purpose, where
does the power of eminent domain stop?"
Clearly, an answer to the last question put by the court is not easily
found !
It should be remembered that Community Redevelopment Laws are not
based solely on the power of eminent domain. The next question which be-
comes important is whether or not these laws may be sustained as a valid
use of the police power. The regulation of slums falls within traditional
374 Pa. 333, 98 A.2d 47 (1953), Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950),
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947),
Ajootian v. Providence Redevelopment Agency. -R. I.-, 91 A.2d 21 (1952), Nashville
Housing Authority v City of Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
25 See note 23 supra.
26 Redevelopment Agency v Hayes, supra note 9.
27 FLA. AcTs 1945, c. 23077, §§ 167.05, 176.01 et seq.
28VA. AcTs 1946, c. 185, § 8-b(S), p. 276.
29 Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E.2d 893
(1953).3
o Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, supra note 17
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concepts of caring for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. But
the Schneider case, noted above, indicated that the regulation of deterior-
ated areas did not fall within the state's regulatory police power. The court
rejected the argument of counsel that the principle of law which sustains
zoning laws should sustain the application of Community Redevelopment
Laws to deteriorated areas. This argument deserves consideration.
Are Community Redevelopment Laws an Extension of the
Principle Behind Zoning Laws?
One extension of the sovereign's police power is the power to enact zon-
ing laws for the general public welfare. The only limit on a zoning regula-
tion is that it bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare.3' Thus the turning point is the court's definition of gen-
eral welfare, and whether or not the particular zoning law is substantially
related to promoting that welfare.
Assuming that slums fall within the powers of a state to regulate by
eminent domain or zoning measures, what about the deteriorated area?
Under the general welfare theory is it not logical to extend such powers over
the deteriorated area? Suppose that there is a section of a city which con-
sists mostly of hills. Streets have been platted at 90 degree angles, criss-
crossing the area. Because of the hills most of these streets if ever built
would be unusable. In addition, only a small percentage of the lots have
ground which may be occupied. Unable to use their land many taxpayers
have let taxes lapse, so that a good portion of the land has large tax defici-
ences. Of the remaining land only 10% or 15 % is occupied beneficially This
would be an ideal land for zoning. Streets could be laid out following con-
tours; lots could be set out, which could be beneficially used for homes,
industries or parks. Because of the peculiar ownership of the land, result-
ing from its disuse and layout, ordinary zoning regulations would be, prac-
ticably speaking, useless. Yet, it would be within the state's power of pro-
tecting the general welfare of the public.
Thus it can be seen that in the deteriorated area there exists a situation
which could be zoned against. The only trouble is that due to the inherent
nature of the area with its widespread ownership, its land with large tax
deficiencies, and its undesirable conditions, zoning in and of itself would
not achieve the end sought. But mere zoning laws exempt existing uses from
the regulation 2 and it is unlikely that there would be any new purchasers
or changed uses of deteriorated land. The greatest benefit would come from
zoning an area as a unit and seeing that the new owners of the land keep
the regulations. The most practical way of doing this is to get the blighted
area under the control of one owner. The Community Redevelopment
Agency is that owner. In leasing the land or selling it they can make sure
the proper regulations will be imposed and kept. The landowner has the
3 1 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
3 2 See Note, 86 A.L.R. 684 (1933), 58 Am. JUm 1021, Zoning § 146.
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right to reasonable compensation and the possiblity of participating m the
new development.-1
The two cases, holding Community Redevelopment Laws to be uncon-
stitutional involved a peculiar problem. In each the project was purely
along commercial lines. In Atlanta to uphold the project would have dis-
placed a large Negro population occupying low-rent housing No return
housing provision was made, so that a large segment of population would
suddenly have been left homeless. Rather than aiding the general welfare
of the public, a greater problem would have been set loose in the form of a
homeless population.
The Hayes case involved a deteriorated area known as Diamond
Heights. It included 500 lots owned by separate individuals. These lots
ranged from 25 feet width to parcels of half an acre. Only 15% of the area
was occupied. Faulty street planning was present. The project involved
predominantly redevelopment to provide public places, such as schools and
parks, and residences of single and multi-family types. By ordinance the
County Board of Supervisors declared the existence of a critical need of
land for expansion purposes due to the rapid growth of San Francisco and
the growing housing shortage.
In the face of these findings it is arguable that Community Redevelop-
ment Laws ought to be upheld as implementing the state's power to zone
against conditions which endanger the general welfare of the public. But
the Schneider case refused to uphold the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Law as applied to deteriorated areas on that basis. The court held
that zoning laws must be strictly construed and reasoned that the general
welfare would not be substantially aided in the case of deteriorated areas.
The court warned against an extension by redefinition of "general welfare,"
so that private rights would be unduly interfered with.
Are Community Redevelopment Laws a Threat to Individual
Property Rights.
The ground for attacking Community Redevelopment Laws is that they
violate basic property rights. An old New York case on eminent domain
discussed at length the individual's property right." Community Redevel-
opment Laws seek to transfer one individual's property to another. Whether
or not this is done arbitrarily is the essence of the question involved. Three
cases indicate that Community Redevelopment Laws are a threat to private
property rights and ought to be strictly construed."
The Schneider case warns against the danger to private rights created
by redefinition of "general welfare." Judge Prettyman points out that there
is no more subtle way of transforming the basic concepts of our govern-
3 CALiF. HEALTn AND SAFETY CODE § 33275.
34 Bloodgood v. The Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837).
35Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, supra note 9; Adams v.
Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, supra note 3, Housing Authority ox Atlanta v. Johnson,
supra note 17
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ment, of shifting from the preeminence of individual rights to the preemi-
nence of government objectives. The court was concerned with the distinc-
tions between the slum and the deteriorated area. The court held that the
contemplated resale to private individuals did not contaminate the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Law6 when applied to the public purpose of
eliminating slums. The court saw an evident evil in the slum and a great
necessity to destroy slums for the benefit of the public. But the court re-
fused to see the same necessity or public benefit in eliminating the deterio-
rated area.
Frankly, the sole fault of the deteriorated area is that it fails to meet
modern standards. There is no immediate or threatened harm from the
mere fact that an area is not used to its full economic potentiality
"Let us suppose that it is backward, stagnant, not properly laid out,
economically Eighteenth Century-anything except detrimental to the
health, safety, or morals. Suppose its owners and occupants like it that
way.. The slow, the old, the small in ambition, the devotee of the out-
moded have no less right to property than have the quick, the young, the
aggressive, and the modernistic or futuristic.
Even if the line between regulation and seizure, between the
power to regulate and the power to seize, is not always etched deeply, it is
there. And even if we progress in our concepts of the 'general welfare', we
are not at liberty to obliterate, the boundary of governmental power fixed
by the Constitution- ' ' T
The weight of authority does not agree with thisY3 It holds that the de-
teriorated area is a drag on the taxpayer and the economy, consequently
detrimental to the general welfare of the public, and should be forcibly
eliminated.
Conclusion.
The law as it stands today shows, with three possible exceptions, 9 a
very liberal and favorable attitude toward Community Redevelopment
Laws. The tendency shown, unless radically diverted, can only lead to the
conclusion that each new test of these laws will result in their being held
constitutional. The legislatures have determined them to be a necessary
element of progress in the modern age, and courts seem to hold this "prog-
ress" to be within limits set by the Constitution.40
36 D.C. CODE 5-701 et seq. (1951).
Sr Schneider v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency, supra note 9.
88 Chicago Land Clearance Commission v. White, supra note 24.
39 See note 36 supra.
40 The constitutionality of these laws has also been attacked on the basis of denial of
equal protection, lending public credit to private individuals and wrongfully delegating legis-
lative functions to adminnitrative agencies. These considerations were outside the scope of this
comment, but they should not be entirely ignored. Except for the cases in note 36 supra the
holdings on these three questions have been uniform. Of particular help are the decisions cited
in note 9 supra.
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